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This paper investigates the role of output quality control in a multi agent setting
with moral hazard. The principal is in charge of a team of agents who produce
the output. The marketing of this output can be either a success or entail huge
losses. At the time of marketing the product, the principal is uncertain about
its quality and can only observe an imperfect signal of it. This creates an ex post
ine±ciency (a successful project may not be undertaken) and a room for monitoring
output's quality. In the paper, we describe when the principal will pay for this costly
monitoring and its e®ect on agents' incentives to exert e®ort. We show that there
are distortions ex ante in the contract o®ered by the principal and ex post in the
continuation decision. The monitoring can only ensure ex post e±ciency. The ex
ante e±ciency requires e®ort observability.
R¶ esum¶ e
Dans ce papier, nous ¶ etudions le r^ ole du controle de la qualit¶ e d'un produit dans
le cadre d'un modµ ele d'al¶ ea moral avec plusieurs agents. Le principal est responsable
d'une ¶ equipe d'agents qui produisent l'output. La commercialisation du produit est
soit un succes soit elle entra^ ³ne de fortes pertes pour le principal. Au moment de
commercialiser le produit, le principal ne conna^ ³t pas la qualit¶ e du produit et ne
peut observer qu'un signal imparfait de celle ci. Cela cr¶ ee une in¶ e¯cacit¶ ee xp o s t( u n
projet pro¯table peut ne pas ^ etre commercialis¶ e) et une place pour le contr^ o l ed el a
qualit¶ e du produit. Dans ce papier, nous d¶ ecrivons quand le principal va payer pour
ce contr^ ole co^ uteux de la qualit¶ e et son e®et sur les incitations des agents µ a fournir
de l'e®ort. Nous montrons que dans ce cadre, il y a des distortions ¶ al af o i se xa n t e
dans les contrats o®erts et ex post dans la d¶ ecision de continuation. Le monitoring
peut supprimer l'ine±cience ex post. L'e±cience ex ante requiert l'observabilit¶ ed e s
e®orts.
¤I would like to thank F. Bloch, F. Heider and P. M. Picard for useful discussions and comments.1 Introduction
This paper investigates the role of output quality control in a multi agent setting with
moral hazard. The principal is in charge of a team of agents1 who produce an output for
her. The marketing of this output can be either a success or entail huge losses. At the
time of selling the output, the principal is uncertain about its quality and can only observe
an imperfect signal of it. This creates an ex post ine±ciency (a successful project may
not be undertaken) and a room for monitoring output's quality. In the paper, we describe
when the principal will pay for this (costly) monitoring and its e®ect on agents' incentives
to exert e®ort. We add to the problem of team production an interaction between the
productive units (agents) and the principal. The principal doesn't participate in the
production process but in°uences it by choosing the level of e®ort he puts in monitoring
and by choosing when she sells the product. We study how these decisions a®ect the
moral hazard problem in the team. The main question raised by this paper is the relation
between information gathered after the design of the contract and the incentives provided
to the agents.
The relations we have in mind are for example two divisions of a ¯rm who have to
cooperate for the development of a new product. The marketing of this product may be
successful or not. If the divisions cannot be interested in ¯rm's pro¯t and losses, the ¯rm
will pay the division contingent on the decision of marketing. In this paper, we investigate
when the ¯rm will exert a control on output. And what is the e®ect of such a control on
divisions incentive to work. An other examples is teamwork, where the e®ort of all team
members creates the value of output. In team, it is impossible to distinguish individual
contributions. Team members are paid contingents on a commonly observable variable
(ex. joint output). We investigate if the team owner will invest in control activities to
check the (at that time uncertain) value of the output and how the control activity a®ects
team members incentives.
Recent works in incentive theory have study the role of information acquisition (mon-
itoring) in principal agent relationships. The papers of Khalil and Lawar¶ ee [1995, 1998]
study the role of input and output monitoring in the adverse selection case. Cr¶ emer [1994,
1995] study the role of monitoring in a moral hazard setting.
Cr¶ emer [1995] shows that it is not always optimal for the principal to acquire new
information about the circumstances under which the agent has performed his task. He
shows an investigation of the reasons of a bad result may increase the cost of agent's
incentives. It is sometimes better to not use the monitoring, even if it is costless and keep
the agent at "arm's length".
Cr¶ emer [1994]studies the incentives to monitor of one (or two) principals who delegate
productive investment to an agent. His model is a model of vertical integration in which
the the monitoring decision is taken either by one or two principals. The monitoring
decision depends on the cost and bene¯ts of associated to this decision which includes the
change in incentives' cost. Our framework is more or less the same. We extend his analysis
to one principal multi-agent case and we modify the role of monitoring. Monitoring is in
our model output quality control while in Cr¶ emer, monitoring is an investigation of the
1We will refer as 'she' for the principal and 'he' for the agents
2reasons of success or failure like in his 95's paper. In his paper, monitoring increases the
cost of agent's incentives while in our model it is the opposite. Our and Cr¶ emer's models
describes the incentives to monitor and the e®ect of monitoring on agents incentives.
Including team production in Cr¶ emer framework allows us to a richer interaction between
the agents and the principal.
The literature on team has focused mainly on the question of implementing an e±-
cient production scheme (Alchian and Demsetz [1972], HolmstrÄ om [1982], McAfee and
McMillian [1991]). The di±culty comes from the fact that e®orts of team members are
unobservable and cannot be inferred from the observed joint output. Our point is dif-
ferent: we assume that the joint output is not observable and we focus on the design of
agents' contracts by the principal and the induced e®ort and monitoring behaviour.
Our model is a model of team production in which the agents and the principal invest
together to develop a product. Agents are responsible for the production of the good, and
the principal invests in control activity. The model is constructed in the following way: at
a ¯rst stage (contracting stage), the principal o®ers a wage contract to the agents. If they
accept the contract, they exert an e®ort (production stage). The level of e®orts is private
information to each agent. The e®orts determine (together with a random shock) the
output's value. This value remain unknown till the marketing of the product. However,
the principal can observe a signal about output's quality. The accuracy of the signal is
a®ected by the principal's monitoring decision. Without monitoring, the signals are noisy.
By investing in monitoring, the principal can observe perfectly informative signals. After
observing the signal, the principal decides if she sells the output (continuation stage).
Finally, the principal collects the surplus and pays wages to the agents. We assume that
the monitoring decision and the signal are private information to the principal. Private
nature of monitoring and signals implies that agents, when choosing their e®ort, will
form expectations about the principal's monitoring decision. And conversely, the principal
decides to monitor, evaluating the cost and bene¯ts of this decision according to her beliefs
about agents unobservable e®orts. Private nature of agents' and principal's decisions form
the central point of our paper. It is because these decisions cannot be contracted ex ante
that there is an interesting strategic interaction between the principal and the agents.
Our goal in this paper is to describe the optimal contract o®ered by the principal
to the team members. This contract doesn't correspond to the ¯rst best contract. Our
comparative static shows that the principal extracts less e®ort compared to a situation
in which she can observe the e®orts level. This ine±ciency has two sources: the lack of
proper signal when the principal doesn't monitor and the payment of rents to the agents.
These extra wages are necessary to extract the agents' e®orts when they work in team.
The paper is organized as follow: in the next section, we present the model. In section
3, we describe the continuation (marketing), monitoring and e®orts decisions. In section
4, we compute the contract selected by the principal. We make after some comparative
static and comment the results. In section 5, we present an extension of the model.
Section 6 concludes.
32 Model
The game played by the principal an the agents is represented by the following sequence
of decisions:
Contracting stage (ex ante stage)
² The principal o®ers a wage contract to the agents.
² Agents accept or reject the contract
Production stage (ad interim stage)
² The agents choose non cooperatively their e®ort levels.
² The principal decides to monitor or not.
The signal is observed by the principal
Continuation stage (ex post stage)
² The principal decides to continue or to stop the relation. She pays the agents
according to the contract and she collects the surplus.
The principal has three decisions to take: ¯rst she o®ers a contract to the agents. This
contract speci¯ed the wages she pays to the agents. Second she decides to whether or not
control the output (monitoring decision) and ¯nally, she decides if she sells the product
(a decision we call continuation decision). After she o®ers the contract, and before she
monitors, agents make an unobservable e®ort. The complexity (and the richness) of
the model comes from this interaction between principal's and agents' decisions. In this
subsection, we explain the assumption we make concerning the principal and the agents.
2.1 Productive units (agents)
Agents are risk neutral2 and have a separable utility:
Ui = Wi ¡ ei i =1 ;2
where Wi is the wage perceived and ei the disutility of e®ort. We normalize their ex ante
reservation utility to zero. We assume that agents have limited liability3: Wi ¸ 0. Given
the wages o®ered by the principal, agents choose the level of e®ort that maximize their
expected utility. For simplicity we take a discrete e®ort level. They can do either a high
or a low e®ort, noted respectively eh
i ;e l
i,i=1 ;2. A high e®ort has a disutility of ¢eh
i .
Without loss of generality, we normalize the disutility of el
i to zero. We assume that the
agents e®orts are private information to them. This creates a con°ict of interest between
the agents and the principal.
2We abstract from risk sharing.
3The limited liability constraint and the non contractibility of the created surplus (see after) implies
that it is not possible to make an agent residual claimant of the relation. Then, even with risk neutral
agents, the incentive problem is non trivial.
42.2 Principal
2.2.1 Output's value
The value of the output will be either equal to S>0o rF<0. S correspond to a
situation where the marketing of the product is a success, while F correspond to a failure.
The principal observes the value of output only at the ¯nal stage of the game if she has
decided to continue. Otherwise, if she has decided to stop, her payo® is zero. Her gross
surplus (before paying wages) is then either S, F or 0.
2.2.2 How e®orts generate output?
The value of the output (S or F) is a function of agents' e®orts. This relation is stochastic.
The e®orts a®ect the probability of having a surplus equals to S. These probabilities are








Table 1. Probability of success
The technology used in this model exhibits three characteristics: First, even if the agents
may di®er with respect to their cost of e®ort, they have a symmetric impact on the
probability of success. In the production process, agents are symmetric. Second, the fact
that it is possible to have a positive probability of success with only one agent performing
a high e®ort (= p), implies that no agent is indispensable for the production. And, indeed,
we will show that there a circumstances in which the principal prefers that only one agent
does a high e®ort.
And third, we assume that the production process exhibits decreasing returns to scale.
This technically corresponds to the following assumption:
Assumption 1 p<¼<2 p .
Assumption 1 states that the additional e®ect on the probability of success of an e®ort is
decreasing from p to ¼ ¡ p.
2.2.3 Signals and monitoring
Prior to the decision of continuation, the principal receives a signal correlated with out-
put's value. The signal can be either high (H)o rl o w( L ). After observing the signal and
before observing the true value of output, the principal decides to continue or to stop.
The investment in monitoring changes the accuracy of the signal. Without monitoring,
the signals are noisy. They re°ects imperfectly the true output's value.
The probabilities of observing H and L are conditional on S and F. These probabil-
ities are changed by the investment in monitoring. Without monitoring, the conditional
probability of observing H, given that the surplus is S is equal to ¼H = prob(HjS) < 1.
5Monitoring increases this probability from ¼H to one. And it conversely decreases the
probability of observing L conditional on S from (1 ¡ ¼H) to zero. We assume that the
probability of observing L conditional on failure is in any cases equals to one. Table 2
summarizes the conditional probability of signals H and L given S and F.
Monitoring No monitoring
prob(HjS) 1 ¼H
prob(LjS) 0 1 ¡ ¼H
prob(HjF) 0 0
prob(LjF) 1 1
Table 2: Conditional probability of observing H and L given S and F.
There is an asymmetry in the production of signals. A bad result cannot lead to a
high signal, while in the absence of monitoring, a high result can lead to a low signal.
When the principals monitors, she sure that if she has observed a signal L, the relation
will end with a failure. While if she doesn't monitor, a low signal doesn't necessary means
that the surplus will be F. In the case of a high signal, whatever the monitoring decision,
the principal is sure that the relation will end with a success.
We assume that the monitoring decision and the signal are private information to the
principal. Private nature of monitoring and signals.
The cost of monitoring output is equals to ¹. To have perfectly informative signals,
the principal has to pay ¹.
2.2.4 Contracts
At ¯rst stage, the principal o®ers a contract to the agents. We restrict the set of feasible
contracts by assuming that:
Assumption 2 The value of the surplus (S or F) cannot be observed by a party outside
the relationship.
This assumption imply together with the private nature of e®ort, monitoring and signals
that the remaining contracting variable is the continuation decision . Then the wages
o®ered to agents will be contingent on this decision. We denote the wage paid to agent i
contingent on continuation W c
i and the wage contingent on stop W s
i .
The aim of the principal is to design contracts and choose the monitoring and contin-
uation decisions that maximizes her expected pro¯ts.
3 Continuation, e®ort and monitoring decisions
In this section, the describe the decisions token by the principal and the agents at each
stage of the game.
63.1 Ex post stage: continuation decision
At the ¯nal stage of the game, after observing the signals, the principal decides if she sells
or not the product. This decision will be contingent on the observed signal. The principal
decides to continue only if after observing signals, she expects a positive pro¯t. This
decision therefore depends on the informational content of the signals. Before analyzing








This assumption means that when the principal doesn't monitor, her expected gross sur-
plus after observing a low signal is negative, even if she's sure that both agents have done
a high e®ort4.
¼(1¡¼H)
1¡¼¼H is the conditional probability of S given L;eh
1;e h




2, no monitoring). These probabilities are constructed with
the Baye's rule and using the probabilities from tables 1 and 2. Assumption 3 implies that
the principal takes a continuation decision which is di®erent when the signal is di®erent.
In section 5, we discuss the results when this assumption is removed.
The continuation decision is given by the following rules:
² If the principal has monitored, the signal she has observed is perfectly informative.
And thus, she continues only if she observes H and if the wages W c
i ;Ws
i are such
that: S ¡ W c
1 ¡ W c
2 ¸ 0 ¡ W s
1 ¡ W s
2. She never continues after a signal L because
she's sure to make a negative pro¯t because the limited liability constraint rules out
negative wages.
² If the principal hasn't monitored, the observed signal is imperfect. She continues
after a signal H if S ¡ W c
1 ¡ W c
2 ¸ 0 ¡ W s
1 ¡ W s
2. After a signal L, her gross pro¯t
is (by assumption) in any cases negative. Then as in the case of monitoring, she
stops.
Assumption 3 implies that without perfectly informative signals (no monitoring case), the
potential losses are su±ciently high to refrain the principal to continue when there is a
doubt about output's value (a low signal is observed). Principal's continuation decision is
simpli¯ed by assumption 3: the continuation decision is independent of e®orts and mon-
itoring decision, and just depends on the observed signal: when a low signal is observed
it is optimal to stop and to continue if a high signal is observed (at least for wages that
keep the net pro¯t positive5).
With the description of the continuation decision, we can compute the ex ante proba-
bility of continuation. These probabilities determine the value of the ex ante pro¯t, and
therefore a®ect the contract, monitoring and e®ort decisions. From the above discussion,
it is clear that the ex ante probability of continuation is equals to the probability of ob-
serving H which is a function of the e®ort and monitoring choices by the principal and
the agents. Table 3 summarize this ex ante probability of continuation Á.
4A fortiori, it will be the case when only one agent did a high e®ort








2 ¼ p ¼¼H p¼H
el
2 p 0 p¼H 0
Table 3: Ex ante probabilities of continuation Á(eh
1;e h
2;m)

















2) ¡ ¹(m) (2)
Where m represents the monitoring decision. m can equals M (monitoring) or NM (no
monitoring). The associated costs ¹(m) are respectively ¹ and 0. And Á is given by table
3.
The investment in monitoring is complementary with agents' e®ort. As table 3 shows,
the gain from monitoring (which is the increase in the probability of continuation when
the surplus equals S) is related to probability of success which depends on agents' e®ort.
If there's no e®ort by the agents, the monitoring is useless.
Without monitoring, there is an ex post ine±ciency: If the principal stops after a
signal L, while the surplus equals S, the continuation decision is ine±cient. Because she
lacks of proper signals, the principal may be refrained to continue while it is (ex post)
optimal to do so. Because ¼¼H <¼and p¼h <p , the principal stops too often in the
absence of monitoring. The only way to remove this ex post ine±ciency is to control the
output. This is exactly the role played by monitoring. Monitoring is an output control,
which suppress by giving precise signals the ex post ine±ciency. However, as it is costly,
it is not always used.
We now turn to the study of monitoring and e®ort decisions. As these decisions
are private, the game played by the principal and the agents can be represented as a
simultaneous move game. This game is represented in ¯gure 1. In ¯gure 1, the payo®s
have the form (agent 1, agent 2). The payo®s of the principal can be computed with
equation 2 and table 3.
3.2 Choice of information technology
The principal monitors output if the cost (¹) is smaller than the bene¯ts. The bene¯ts are
function of agents' e®orts. The monitoring decision will therefore depends on principal's
beliefs about agents' e®orts. When the principal believes that agents i and j have done a









2) ¡ ¹ (3)
where where q = ±i±j¼ +(1¡± i)± jp+(1¡± j)± ipis the ex ante probability of success, are










Combining (3) and (4), at wages (W c
i ;Ws
i), it is optimal to monitor if:
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Figure 1: E®ort-monitoring game
3.3 Agents choice of e®ort
At the wages (W c
i ;Ws
i), the agents will choose the level of e®ort that maximize their
expected utility. The choice of agent i depends on principal monitoring decision and on
agent j's choice of e®ort. The following relations describe the best response of agent i to
agent j's choice of e®ort and principal's monitoring decision.
eh
i i sab e s tr e s p o n s et o( e h
j, monitoring) if W c
i ;Ws
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i ) ¸ ¢e
h
i (7:2)
Agent i randoms his e®ort choice and chooses eh
i with probability ±i in response to a
random choice of eh
j by agent j with a probability ±j, and monitoring by the principal if
W c
i ;Ws





i ) ¸ ±i¢e
h
i (8:1)



















9Agent i randoms his e®ort choice and chooses eh
i with probability ±0
i in response to a
random choice of eh
j by agent j with a probability ±0
j, and no monitoring by the principal
if W c
i ;Ws






















3.4 Summary: equilibria in the e®ort-monitoring game












































































Figure 2: Nash equilibria in the e®ort-monitoring game
lowing ¯gures represent for all possible wages the Nash equilibria in the e®ort-monitoring
game. The left ¯gure shows the equilibria when the principal monitors. The right ¯gure
represents the equilibria when the principal doesn't. The dotted lines on the right ¯gure
are a reproduction of equilibria in the case of monitoring (as depicted in the left ¯gure).
From these ¯gures, it appears that there are wages for which it is not possible to have a
certain e®ort behaviour, unless the principal monitors. It is also important to note that
for some wages, many equilibria may exist at the same time. The equations (5) and (6),
(7), (8) represents how the principal and the agents respond to wages o®ered.
4 Choice of a contract
In this section, we look at the contract selected by the principal. We ¯rst derive the set
of optimal contracts, and after, we make some comparative static analysis.











104.1 Set of feasible contract























2) ¡ m(¹) (2)
The maximization problem must respect the following constraints: individual rationality:
EUi ¸ 0;i=1 ;2 and limited liability: W c
i ¸ 0;Ws
i ¸0;i=1 ;2.
The choices of m by the principal is given by equation (5), the choices of e1 and e2 by
agents 1 and 2 are given by equations 6 to 8 for i =1 ;2.
Before giving the solution to this problem, we give two de¯nitions and establish two
lemmas. These lemmas help us to prove proposition 1 and its corollary.
De¯nition 1: We de¯ne an equilibrium in the game as a pair of wages and the





De¯nition 2: When the principal prefers that the two agents do a high e®ort, we will
refer to this situation as team production. When she prefers only one high e®ort, which
means that agents' e®ort are perfect substitute, we will call this situation delegation of
production.
Lemma 1 The principal o®ers wages W s
i always equal to zero.
This result is obvious to establish. As only the gap between W c
i ¡W s
i matters for incentive
purpose, the value of W s
i will be given by the limited liability constraint.
Lemma 2 If there exist some wages W c
i ;Ws
i such that, given the behaviour of the agents,





i such that: (i) the behaviour of the agents remains the same and (ii)
it is not optimal to monitor (equation 5 is not satis¯ed).
Lemma 1 means that if there exist wages such that, given the behaviour of the agents it
is optimal to monitor, the principal has no interest in deviating to a contract for which
it is not optimal to monitor and the behaviour of the agents is unchanged. To prove
the lemma, we show that such a deviation requires higher wages and that the increase in
wages doesn't compensate the bene¯ts of saving on monitoring cost. A proof of lemma 2
is given in the appendix.
Proposition 1 (i) There are seven equilibria:





















































(ii) These equilibria are unique if ¢eh
1 6=¢ e h
2.
(iii) The principal never o®ers wages for which the agents random their e®ort choices.
A complete proof of proposition 1 is given in the appendix, we just give here the intuitions
behind these results. To derive the set of contract, we proceed case by case: for any
behaviour of the principal and the agents, we search the wages that maximize the pro¯t.
i.e. the lowest wages that induce the selected behaviour. As only the gap (W c
i ¡ W s
i )i s
important for incentive purpose, and as the limited liability constraint binds for W s
i , the
wages W c
i are those who satisfy equations 6 to 8 with equality. To complete the ¯rst part
of the proof, we have to show that the principal has no interest in deviating from these
contracts to other where her monitoring behaviour is changed. This result is established
by lemma 2.
Note that the individual rationality constraint binds only for the equilibria when at
least one agent does a low e®ort. This point is developed further in remark 1.
The third part of proposition 1 tell us that the principal never selects wages that
induce random choice of e®ort by agents. To understand this, we must compare the ex
ante costs and bene¯ts of random choices of e®orts. Ex post, four situations can occur:
both agents have selected a high e®ort, only one agent (1 or 2) has selected a high e®ort, or
none has selected a high e®ort. The ¯rst situation is bene¯cial: there is team production
at a smaller cost than with pure strategies. The total cost is smaller than with the wages
associated with team production. The other three situations are prejudicial: when only
one manager has done a high e®ort, there is cost for the principal. In case of continuation,
she must pay wages to the two agents. and the total wages are greater than the total
wage she has to pay to have delegation of production with pure strategies. When there
is no high e®ort, there is a cost only if the ¯rm monitors. Proposition 1 says that the
ex ante bene¯t associated with the good situation (2 high e®ort) are always smaller than
the ex ante costs of the bad situations8. The advantages of the mixed strategies are more
than o®set by the increase in cost. Ex ante, at the time of contract, the costs and bene¯ts
8Actually our proof shows that the upper bound of pro¯t is always smaller than the pro¯t with only
one manager doing a high e®ort.
12associated with the wages that induce agents to random their choices of e®ort are such
that, it is always possible to ¯nd a wage contract for which they agents don't random
and that give a higher pro¯t to the principal. Then the principal will not o®er wages for
which the agents random their choices of e®ort.
The following corollary is derived from proposition 1:
Corollary 1 If a monitoring equilibrium exists, the principal will never select a contract
for which it is not optimal to monitor.
This corollary extends the result of lemma 2 for the optimal contracts. It states that if ¹
is small enough to guarantee the existence of at least one of the equilibrium contract with
monitoring as de¯ned in proposition 1, the principal never selects a contract in which she
doesn't monitor. The second lemma established that it is not optimal to deviate from
a monitoring contract to a no monitoring contract with the same agent behaviour. The
corrolary states that a deviation from an optimal monitoring contract to an (optimal) no
monitoring contract with any agent behaviour is costly.
4.2 Comparison between equilibria
We compare the equilibria within the set of proposition 1. Depending on parameters
value, the principal selects one of these seven contracts. In this subsection, we make
comparative static analysis to understand what drive the choice of contract.
The comparative static can be summarize as follow: When the principal monitors, she
prefers team production to delegation to agent i if:









When she doesn't monitor, she prefers team production if:









When the principal prefers delegation, she delegates to agent i if ¢eh
i · ¢eh
j and otherwise
to agent j. The left hand side of (9) is the increase in expected surplus, when the













p ; 0). The right hand
side is the increase in expected wages. Equation (10) has the same interpretation when the
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¢ e h
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¼ Hp;0). The corollary 1 limits the comparison:
if a monitoring contract exists, we just have to check at equation (9) to know which
monitoring contract will be selected by the principal. If no monitoring contract exists, we
just look at equation (10).
For our comparisons, we use as benchmark the ¯rst best choice of contract. We call
the ¯rst best contract the contract selected by the principal when he has symmetric
information about e®orts i.e. she observes the level of e®orts. The ¯rst best wage is to
13give to agent i an expected wage equals to ¢eh
i
9. The ¯rst best choice of production mode
is represented in ¯gure 3 . The ¯rst best is to choose team production when
(¼ ¡ p)S ¸ ¢e
h
i (11)
if the principal monitors and










First best choice of team
without monitoring









Figure 3: First best and second best choice of contract as a function of ¢eh
1 and ¢eh
2
In ¯gure 3, the contract chosen by the principal is represented as a function of the
disutility of e®ort ¢eh
1 and ¢eh
2, keeping S and ¹ constant. In this ¯gure, we do not
represent the monitoring conditions. The left ¯gure represents the ¯rst best choice of
contract (equations (11) and (12)). The right ¯gure represents the second best choice
(described by equations (9) and (10)).
The choice between monitoring and no monitoring contract is given by the corollary.
As soon as ¹ is small enough to have an equilibrium with monitoring, we know that an
equilibrium of this class will be chosen. The choice of contract as a function of ¹ and the
surplus' value is represented in ¯gure 4.
In ¯gure 4, the bold lines represent the separations between the contracts. The con-
dition (9) and (10) are represented by the horizontal lines (they are independent of the










simplify the graph we assume that ¢eh
i < ¢eh
j. So the productive e®ort is never delegated
to agent j.
We now develop in few remarks the interesting points:
9For example, the principal can pay ¢eh


























Figure 4: Contracts as a function of ¹ and S
Remark 1 Even with monitoring, the ¯rst best choice of production mode cannot be
achieved.
We develop our argument in three points: ¯rst we show that when the principal chooses
team production, the agents receive a rent. Second, as a direct consequence of the payment
of rents, the team production su®ers a cost disadvantage compared to delegation and
the principal delegates too often compared with the ¯rst best. Third, we look how the
monitoring a®ects the ex ante distortions in the choice of contract.
When the agents work in team, they bene¯t from the e®ort of the other. If agents




¼¡p > 0. Two high e®orts imply the payment of rents to the agents. While when
the production is delegated, the agents have an expected utility equals to their reservation
level. The source of rent is the inability of the principal to give proper incentives to both





















It is easy to see that it is impossible to ¯nd wages that satisfy the three constraints
with equality. These rents have two sources: the non observable of e®ort and the limited
liability of the agents. To avoid the payment of rents, either the e®orts must be observable
or the agents not be wealth constrained. We examine now the e®ect of each of these
10The level of the rent is not linked to principal's monitoring decision.
11We give an argument valid for the case of monitoring. It translates easily to the no monitoring case.
15assumptions. (i) The agents do not have wealth constraint. In this case, the principal can
construct an incentive scheme that satisfy (6.1) and (IR). The wages satisfying these two








¼¡p ). In this case12, the interests of the principal
and the agents are aligned. They still receive an expected wage that correspond to their
disutility of e®ort but now their choices of e®ort re°ect the interest of the principal in
the continuation decision. When the signal is low, the output is not sold but the agents
have to pay a compensation to the principal (wages W s
i are negative). With this incentive
scheme, the agents are responsible for the failure of the project. It is possible to have
two high e®ort without paying any rent to the agents. (ii) The e®orts are observable. In
this case the principal compensates the agents for their disutility of e®ort. In our model,
the principal observes only a signal re°ecting output's quality. From this, the principal
cannot infer agents' e®ort. This creates a "free riding" problem: the agents can receive
a positive wage without doing a high e®ort. An incentive scheme that compensate the
agents just for their disutility of e®ort is not enough to have team production.
This inability to give proper incentives imply the following distortion ex ante in the
choice of contracts: compared to the ¯rst best, the principal delegates to often. The ¯rst
best choice13 of production mode is represented in ¯gure 3 and described by equations (11)
and (12). The principal is not able to replicate the ¯rst best. This is a direct consequence
of the payment of rents to the agents. It creates a distortion that favors the delegation
of investment. This result is independent of the monitoring decision. The payment of
rent increases the cost of the team. This cost disadvantage explains why delegation of
production is for more parameter values compared to ¯rst best.
When the principal monitors, the level of rent paid to the agents under team produc-
tion is unchanged whatever the monitoring decision. Then, even with monitoring there is
a distortion in the choice of contract. There is a bias favoring delegation. The control of
the output is not enough to implement the ¯rst best. However, the fact that the principal
monitors reduced the global ine±ciency. This point is developed in our second remark.
Remark 2 The monitoring increases the global e±ciency by (i) decreasing the cost of
incentives and (ii) removing the ex post ine±ciency.
The second point is obvious. It was postulated in assumption 3. The ¯rst point can be







¼¡p and an increase in the probability of being paid. These two
e®ects compensate and the expected wage of the agents is constant. But the wages paid
ex post are smaller if she monitors. This point is clear in ¯gure 3. For middle values
of e®orts' cost, the principal can have team production only if she monitors. When the
costs of e®ort increase, to have team production, the principal must decreases the wages,
in order to keep her pro¯t at a su±ciently high level. The decrease of wages is feasible
only if ¹ is such that it is e±cient to monitor. When ¹ is too high, it is not possible to
decrease the cost of incentives and the principal has to switch from team production to
delegation. The lack of proper signals which corresponds to a situation where it is not
12With this incentive scheme, the monitoring and continuation decisions are unchanged.
13We called the ¯rst best the choice made under symmetric information about e®orts.
16optimal to monitor introduces a new distortion in the ex ante decision of contract. The
wage must be increased to compensate the diminution in the probability of continuation
and this introduce a second bias in favor of delegation of production. But this second
bias can be removed if the principal monitors. A direct consequence of the decrease in
wages, is that the monitoring favors team production. We can give a similar argument






p . This decrease in wage has a positive impact on the e±ciency. When the cost
¢eh
i increases, the principal switches to no production sooner if she doesn't monitor14.
Note that there is also a distortion in the monitoring decision compared. At equilib-
rium, when the principal observes the e®orts, she doesn't pay any rent to the agents and
just compensated for their disutility of e®ort. Therefore, as wage are smaller in the case
of team production, the principal monitors too few when she doesn't observe the e®ort.
There is a trade o® between the cost of information and the level of investment.
There is more investment in productive activities when the cost of information is low.
For the same costs of e®ort, the ¯rm decision may change from team to delegation or
from delegation to no production if the cost of monitoring increases . The incentives to
perform e®ort are positively correlated with the cost of information ¹.
4.3 Conclusion: the role of information
Information plays a di®erent role in the two production mode. Under team production,
the observation of ex post joint output does not reveal information about e®orts. If it is
sometimes pro¯table for the principal to monitor, it doesn't make her information about
agents e®ort more precise. This impossibility for the principal to infer, even with moni-
toring, the individuals e®orts is the source of rent for the agents. While when production
is delegated, we are in a more classical moral hazard problem. There is an agent who
receives a constant wage (equals to zero). He isn't incite to do e®ort. The ¯nal result
signals the other agent's e®ort. The monitoring is in this case the suppression of one
source of uncertainty. If she monitors, she suppress the uncertainty surrounding signals.
In the model we described, there are two sources of ine±ciency. First, ex ante the
contract may not be e±cient. The principal chooses the wrong production mode, which
means in our context that the principal delegates the production too often. And second,
ex post the continuation decision may be ine±cient. The ex post ine±ciency takes its
source in the absence of precise signals. The monitoring can remove (at a cost ¹) the ex
post ine±ciency. In all the monitoring equilibria, the continuation decision is optimal.
But ex post e±ciency is not the sole role of monitoring. It also a®ects the ex ante contract
decision. The choice of production mode is a®ected by the preciseness of information about
output. We have shown in remark 2 that the production mode depends on the availability
of information (together with other factors). Availability of information (represented by
14When the principal doesn't monitor, she switches to no production as soon as ¼HpS¡¢eh
i < 0 When
she monitors, no production starts when pS ¡ ¢eh
i ¡ ¹<0. A necessary condition for the existence of




p ). Combining these three inequalities, it is easy to
show that the principal doesn't produce for lower values of ¢eh
i when she doesn't monitor.
17monitoring cost) a®ects the choice of a production technology. Ex ante ine±ciency is
not completely restored by the monitoring. The absence of proper incentives imply the
payments of rents to team members. These rents distort the choice of production. If
monitoring decreases (at equilibrium) the wages paid to the agents, it does not decrease
the rents. And therefore if monitoring restores ex post e±ciency, it does not solve the ex
ante ine±ciency problem.
5 Extension
In section 3, we assumed that it is not e±cient for the principal to continue if she had
observed a low signal (assumption 3). In this section, we ¯rst present an alternative as-
sumption which is less restrictive than assumption 3 but who has the same implication in
term of continuation decision. After, we look at the cases where this alternative assump-
tion doesn't hold. And we show that the principal has to choose a contract that commit
herself to a given behaviour.
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¼ H( ¼ ¡ p )), which corresponds to an equilibrium (eh
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2, no monitoring), the ex-






¼ H( ¼ ¡ p );0). The results of the paper are unchanged when the less restrictive
assumption 4 holds.
We now turn to the study of the cases when at least one of these equations is not
veri¯ed. In this case, the continuation decision won't be contingent on the observed signal
(as it was previously) but will be contingent on the o®ered contract. When assumption 4
does not hold, it means that the losses15 F are not high enough compared to the gains to
stop after a low signal or alternatively that without monitoring, the signal are too noisy
(¼H is low) and an observation of L is not a good signal of the future result. The violation
of one of the inequality of assumption 4 has dramatic results on the incentive problem.
Without monitoring, it becomes impossible to provide incentives to the agents, unless
the principal can commit herself to stop after a low signal. Without monitoring or this
commitment to stop, the continuation decision is independent of the signal and therefore,
the wage received by the agent is constant and equals to W c
i . But at a constant wage,
the agents always do a low e®ort. Then the contract may contain a commitment device
(that takes the form of an increase in wages), in order to credibilize principal's strategy.
15remember that F<0.
18In the next subsections, we describe the changes in continuation, monitoring, e®orts
and contracts decisions.
5.1 Continuation decision:
When (13) doesn't hold, the expected pro¯t after a low signal and two high e®ort is
positive, if the principal doesn't monitor. Then in this case, it is optimal to continue
whatever is the observed signal16. The violation of the inequality (14) has the same
implication for the case of one high e®ort and no monitoring. When the principal monitors,
the continuation decision is unchanged compared to the result under assumption 3: it is
optimal to continue after H and to stop after L.
5.2 Monitoring condition
After o®ering wages W c
i and agents' e®ort, it is optimal to monitor if the expected increase





2) ¡ ¹ (15)
Where q is the probability of success given by agents' behaviour. The pro¯t without










Subtracting (16) from (15), it is optimal to monitor at wages W c
i if:






We assumed that the only contracting variable is the continuation decision. But if the
principal takes a continuation decision which is, in the absence of monitoring, independent
of the signals, it is not anymore possible to o®er a contract to the agent that incite them
to perform e®ort. Then, the principal must o®er wages that commit herself either to
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The ¯rst constraints are the standard individual rationality and limited liability. The
constraints (18) is a positive pro¯t requirement, and (17) ensures that it is optimal for the
principal to monitor. If the constraints (17) and (18) are satis¯ed, it is optimal to monitor.
Alternatively, the principal can choose wages such that (20) is satis¯ed and commit herself
to stop after a low signal by choosing wages that respect the ¯fth constraint (19). The
constraint (20) ensures that it is not optimal to monitor. (19) ensures that it is optimal to
stop after L without monitoring. The behaviour of the agents at wages W c
i is described by
equations (6) to (8). The only change for the agents is their expectations about principal's
monitoring behaviour. The solution to this problem is given in proposition 2.
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the monitoring equilibria are either equal to those of proposition 1, if at these wages, the
monitoring condition (17) is satis¯ed or by the monitoring condition. The wages in no
monitoring equilibria are the lowest wages that satisfy (19) and (20). In all the case, the
wages must be at least greater than those of proposition 1 to extract the desired level of
e®ort from the agents.
The set of contract and a proof of proposition 2 are given in the appendix. What is
clear is that, to extract e®ort from the agents, the principal must commit herself to a
given monitoring and continuation decision. The goal of this commitment is to have a
continuation decision that is contingent on the observed signal. Given our restrictions
in the contracting variables, the only way to commit to a given behaviour is to increase
the wages in order to make a deviation from the prescribed behaviour harmful. The
principal may either commit to monitor. In this case, she must increase the wages only
if the optimal wages of proposition 1 do not satisfy the monitoring condition (17). Or
she commits to stop after a low signal by increasing the wages above their optimal level
to have a an null or negative expected pro¯t after a low signal if she continues. The
expected pro¯t will be null if at these wages the no monitoring condition (20) is satis¯ed.
If not, the principal has to increase the wage further in order to ful¯ll the no monitoring
condition.
The following remark analyses the global e±ciency of this solution.
Remark 3 When the principal needs to credibilize her monitoring and continuation de-
cisions, it decreases global e±ciency.
There are new distortions in the contract and monitoring decisions. First, the additional
wage that is necessary to credibilize a strategy increases the distortions in the ex ante
choice of contract described in remark 1. This introduces a new bias that favors dele-
gation of investment and no production. Second, the monitoring decision is ine±cient.
The decision is based on equation (17) instead of equation (5). Previously, when the
20wages increased, it became more di±cult to monitor. Under this new setting, when the
wages increase, it becomes easier to monitor. This di®erence comes from the bene¯t of
monitoring. When it is optimal to stop after L, the bene¯t of monitoring is an increase by
q(1 ¡ ¼H) in the number of cases where the relation ends with a success. When it is not
optimal to stop after L, the bene¯t is a decrease by (1¡q) in the number of cases where
the relation ends with a failure. The losses associated with a failure are:F ¡ W c
1 ¡ W c
2.
This explain why the wages a®ect di®erently the incentive to monitor. It is not clear
that the principal monitors less when assumption 4 is violated. She monitors less if:
(1 ¡ q)(¡F + W c
1 + W c
2) · q(1 ¡ ¼H)(S ¡ W c
1 ¡ W c
2)
6 Conclusion
The main message of this paper is that without input or output observability, it is not
possible to implement the e±cient team production, even if the principal observes a signal
re°ecting perfectly the output's quality. To achieve the ¯rst best, the principal needs to
make payment to the agents contingent either on the observed input or on the observed
output.
If we suppress the limited liability constraint, and we deal with a team of risk neutral
agents, it doesn't guarantee that the ¯rst best could be achieved. An incentive scheme
as the one described in remark 1, where the agents and principal's interest are aligned by
making the agent responsible of the losses of the project may leads to the collapse of the
incentive system if with the lower W c
i , the fourth assumption is not satis¯ed.
This raise the question of the credibility of the strategies. When the signal are too
noisy or the loss are not high enough in absolute value, the incentive system looses its
credibility and to restore the credibility, the principal needs to introduce new distortions
in her incentive scheme.
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22A Proof of lemma 1
The proof is quite simple. If at wages W c
i ;Ws
i = 0 the agents choose an e®ort level that
give an ex ante probability of continuation ^ q and if it is optimal to monitor, it implies
that:











i, if the behaviour of the agents is not changed, and if it is not optimal to
monitor, it implies:





Combine (21) and (22) we have:



















Then if (21) is true, the following must be true:









And this proves the lemma.
B Proof of proposition 1
To prove proposition 1, we ¯rst show how we compute the set of contract then we show
that the contract that imply a random choice of e®ort by manager are always dominated.
Finally, we proof the uniqueness of the equilibrium.
B.1 Determination of the set of contracts
We compute the set of contract simply by solving principal's maximization problem. She




2) that maximize her pro¯ts (given by equation 2).
Subject to the following constraints: First, agents must receive at least their reservation
utility normalized to zero (individual rationality). Second, wages must be non negative
(limited liability) and third, if the principal wants the agent to follow a certain behaviour,
wages must be such that agents freely chooses this behaviour (incentive compatibility).
The ¯rst lemma says that the limited liability constraint binds at W s
i .
Given this, we look for all agents and principal behaviour, excluding for the moment
those who imply random choices of e®ort, the lowest wages W c
i that satisfy the correspond-
ing incentive compatibility constraints (these constraints are given for each behaviour by
equations 6 to 8). In the next subsection, we proof that principal never selects contract
for which agents random their choices.
We proceed cases by cases:
23For e1 = el
1;e 2 =e l
2 and no monitoring, the principal maximizes her pro¯t by o®ering
W c
1 = W c
2 = 0. For no e®ort, the principal pays no wages. Because of the complementarity
between productive e®ort and monitoring, the principal never monitors when both agents
select a low e®ort.
For e1 = eh
1;e 2 =e l
2 and no monitoring, the lowest wages are W c
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The cases e1 = el
1;e 2 =e h
2, no monitoring, e1 = el
1;e 2 =e h
2, monitoring, are symmetric
to the two previous one.
For e1 = eh
1;e 2 =e h
2 and monitoring, the principal selects the wages that make both
agents indi®erent between a high and a low e®ort, given that she monitors and that the
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For e1 = eh
1;e 2 =e h
2 and no monitoring, the principal selects the wages that make both
agents indi®erent between a high and a low e®ort, given that she doesn't monitor and that
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To complete the proof, we must show that there is no pro¯table deviations from these
contracts. If one contract is optimal, the only potentially pro¯table deviation is to change
the wages in order to modify the monitoring behaviour but not the agents' choices of
e®ort. Consider ¯rst a contract where the principal monitors. We know from lemma 2,
that it is not optimal to change the wages (it is necessary an increase in total wages) to
have no monitoring17. From a contract with monitoring, there is no pro¯table deviation.
Second, consider a deviation from a contract where the principal doesn't monitor.
This means that at these wages, the monitoring condition (5) isn't satis¯ed. Then to
have monitoring, the principal must decrease wages. But if there exist wages smaller than
the initial one where the monitoring condition is satis¯ed and where the agent behaviour
is unchanged, the initial contract cannot be optimal. If so, it would contradict lemma 1.
B.2 Elimination of contracts that induce mixed strategies
To show that the center never wants to o®er a contract that induce random choices of
e®orts by agents, we proceed in two steps: we ¯rst compute an upper bound of pro¯t
that can be reached with mixed strategies in e®ort game and after show that this upper
bound is always dominated by other contracts.
17As the monitoring decision is unobservable, there is no credible commitment for the principal to a
non monitoring behaviour. Then the only way to have no monitoring is to change the wags, in order to
have condition 5 unsatis¯ed.














¼¡p], and we assume
that for all these wages, the monitoring condition is satis¯ed. We after extend the proof
(trivially) to the cases where it isn't satis¯ed.
We de¯ne q = ±i±j¼ +( 1¡± i) ± jp+( 1¡± j) ± ipas the ex ante probability of success









2 We now compute, for each q 2 [0;¼] the smallest total wage that gives
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p2 ¡ (¼ ¡ 2p)q
(24)
For the rest of this subsection, we assume (for notational simplicity) that ¢eh
1 =¢ e h
2 and
we call after the disutility of e®ort ¢eh. The proof trivially extends to other cases.
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q ¤correspond to the upper bound of pro¯t with mixed strategy contract. The solution q¤
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q ¤(2p ¡ ¼)¢e
(p2 +( ¼¡2 p ) q ¤) (3=2) (25)
The right hand side of equality (25) is the marginal cost of q, the left hand side is
the marginal bene¯t. The marginal cost is increasing and convex. By convexity of the
marginal cost, q¤ is unique.







p ) that gives a higher probability of success (= p)a tal o w e rc o s t .
If q¤ is greater than ¼, the maximal pro¯t with mixed strategies is (by convexity of




¼¡p, which gives degenerated mixed strategies:± = ° =1 .
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We proof then that if (26) is satis¯ed, q¤ is dominated by a pure strategy with one









p2 +( ¼¡2 p ) q ¤
) (28)




· (¼ ¡ p)S (29)







p2 +( ¼¡2 p ) q
) (30)

















· (¼ ¡ p)(
2q
q
p2 +( ¼¡2 p ) q
¡1) (32)
And this inequality is satis¯ed strictly for all q 2 [p;¼]: First note that (32) is satis¯ed
with inequality for q = p. And the rate of growth of right hand side is positive and
increasing while the rate of growth of left hand side is positive but constant. For q = p,
rate of growth are equal. It implies that (30) is always satis¯ed.






p ;0). to be valid, it must be that if the monitoring condition is satis¯ed for the wages















It implies that if:
















Up to now, we considered that the monitoring conditions where satis¯ed for all the





















¼ Hp;0). The proof is the same replacing p by p0 = p¼h and ¼ by ¼0 = ¼¼H.
B.3 Uniqueness of equilibrium






¼¡p) when the monitoring condition
is satis¯ed if agents select (eh
1;e h
2) and the monitoring condition isn't satis¯ed if agents
random their e®ort choice. In this case two equilibria may exist but if ¢eh
1 6=¢ e 2
h, there
is a possibility of reaching the same ex ante probability of success given by the mixed
strategy at a lower total cost by giving equal wages determined by equation (24). The
mixed strategy contract is any more an equilibrium in the entire game.
C Proof of corollary 1
The proof is simpli¯ed by the results of lemma 2. In this lemma, we proved that a no
monitoring equilibrium cannot dominates a monitoring equilibrium in which the agents
select the same level of e®ort. Then to prove the corollary, we just need to prove that
a no monitoring equilibrium can not dominates a monitoring equilibrium with di®erent
e®ort levels. There are only two cases to consider:





Our proof is simple, we just show that the condition for the existence of monitoring
equilibrium are not compatible with the conditions for the dominance of a no monitoring
equilibrium.
The monitoring equilibrium exist if at wages (W c
i ;Wc
j)=( ¢ e h
ip;0), the following
monitoring condition is satis¯ed:
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2;M) exists, it cannot dominates (eh
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j;M), otherwise lemma 2
applies. So, either this equilibrium does not exist:
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or it is dominated by (eh
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27The no monitoring equilibrium dominates the monitoring one if:
¼¼h(S ¡
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Now, we show that there is an incompatibility between the conditions (33), (34) and
(35) or alternatively between (33), (34) and (36). A necessary condition for (33) and (34)
is:
¼(1 ¡ ¼H)(S ¡
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And this equation is exactly equation (36).
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the two necessary conditions are compatible if:
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Which is impossible and prove that our initial supposition was wrong.





We proceed as in the previous case: The monitoring equilibrium exists if:
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(38) and (41) are compatible only if:










(40) and (42) are compatible only if:
¼H ¸ 1
And this is impossible and prove the corollary.
D Proof of proposition 2
To proof this second proposition, we proceed case by case. The argument gived in propo-
sition 1 to eliminates contracts that induce mixed strategies is still valid. For each equi-
librium, we look at the wages that satisfy the relevant constraints.
Team production and monitoring(eh
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29Team production and no monitoring (eh
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